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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) requires a district court to dismiss a criminal prosecution if an
indictment or information is not filed within six months of “the date of his arrest.”  Mr. Morgan
asserts that he was arrested for felony eluding in February of 2010, when he was taken by
Montana officers, to be arraigned in front of a Montana justice of the peace, who ordered
Mr. Morgan to remain in a Montana jail, at the request of a Montana prosecutor, all stemming
from an arrest warrant issued by an Idaho magistrate.  Because the charging document was not
filed in this case until July of 2015, Mr. Morgan asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motions to dismiss the felony eluding charge for violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial.
In  its  Respondent’s  Brief,  the  State  first  asserts  Mr.  Morgan  was  not  arrested  until
May 18, 2015, when an Idaho officer took him into custody, because neither the Montana
prosecutor  nor  the  justice  of  the  peace  had  “any  legal  authority  to  arrest  [Mr.  Morgan]  on  an
Idaho warrant.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.5-7.)  Next, the State argues that even if Mr. Morgan
was arrested on February 26, 2010, as Mr. Morgan argued in his Appellant’s Brief, the State
showed “good cause” for the delay because no preliminary hearing could be held, and thus no
information could be filed, while Mr. Morgan was in custody in Montana.  (Respondent’s Brief,
p.7.)  Finally, the State argues that any error in the district court’s denial of Mr. Morgan’s motion
to dismiss was harmless, because the dismissal would have been without prejudice and the State
could have filed the charges for a third time in a new complaint.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-8.)
Each of these arguments are without merit.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Morgan’s Appellant’s Brief and they are not be repeated in detail in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUE
Did  the  district  court  err  when  it  denied  Mr.  Morgan’s  motions  to  dismiss  due  to  the  State’s
failure to obtain an indictment or information within six months of his arrest?
4
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Morgan’s Motions To Dismiss Due To The State’s
Failure To Obtain An Indictment Or Information Within Six Months Of His Arrest
Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) states that, absent a showing of good cause by the State, the
district  court  must  order  a  dismissal  of  charges  “when a  person  has  been  held  to  answer  for  a
public offense, if an indictment or information is not found against him and filed with the court
within six (6) months from the date of his arrest.”  Mr. Morgan asserts that he was arrested, for
purposes of this statute, on February 26, 2010, when Montana officers brought him in front of a
Montana judge, who ordered him to remain in a Montana jail until either $10,000 bond was
posted or Idaho officers took him back to Idaho, all due to an Idaho arrest warrant.  Mr. Morgan
argues the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.1
The State’s argument – that Mr. Morgan was not arrested until May of 2015 – rests
largely upon its conclusion that Mr. Morgan failed to demonstrate Montana officers had the
authority to arrest Mr. Morgan on his Idaho warrant.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.6-7.)  Even if this
were legally accurate,2 the State’s argument fails because the 6-month speedy trial limitation set
forth in I.C. § 19-3501(1) begins to run when the defendant is arrested, regardless of whether an
1 The district court’s decision was based in large part on its finding that the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers Act, codified at I.C. §§ 19-5001—5008, required Mr. Morgan to initiate
proceedings demanding that Idaho officials bring him back to Idaho for trial, and his failure to do
so deprived him of his right to a speedy trial codified at I.C. § 19-3501(1).  (R., pp.131-137, 175-
178.)  On appeal, as they did in the district court, both parties recognize the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers Act does not apply in Mr. Morgan’s case.  (R., pp.144-148, 158-164; Appellant’s
Brief, pp.9-10; Respondent’s Brief, p.4, fn.2 (recognizing that the State’s appellate argument
differs from the basis for the district court’s ruling).)
2 The argument is not legally accurate.  Montana law authorizes Montana peace officers to make
a warrantless arrest of a person found in Montana suspected of committing a crime in another
state, based “upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state
with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of 1 year or more.”  (See M.C.A.
46-30-301).)
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arrest warrant is served or whether the arrest itself was lawful.  “The court, unless good cause to
the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed … When a
person has been held to answer for a public offense, if an indictment or information is not found
against him and filed with the court within six (6) months from the date of his arrest.”  I.C. § 19-
3501(1).  Notably, the statute requires neither a lawful arrest, nor the service of an arrest warrant.
Id.  The absence of these requirements is consistent with the fact that neither an unlawful arrest,
nor a warrantless arrest are a bar to prosecution by indictment or information. See State v.
Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting “[a]n unlawful arrest is not a defense to
the underlying charge, but is merely a bar to the admission of certain evidence.”); see also
I.C. § 19-603(4) (authorizing a peace officer to make an arrest “[o]n a charge made, upon a
reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.”). The State’s argument is
without merit.
The  State  next  claims  that,  even  if  Mr.  Morgan  was  arrested  for  purposes  of  I.C.  §  19-
3501(1) in February of 2010, it “showed good cause why the information was not filed until
July 24, 2015”; namely, “the state could not proceed with the preliminary hearing until after
[Mr.] Morgan was released by Montana[.]”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)  While Mr. Morgan’s
presence in a Montana prison may demonstrate good cause excusing the State’s failure to file an
information within six months of Mr. Morgan’s arrest, it does not excuse the State’s failure to
seek a grand jury indictment.  A grand jury’s authority to issue an indictment is not dependent
upon the defendant’s presence. See generally I.C. §§ 19-1001—1123.  The State failed to
demonstrate, either in the district court or on appeal, that it was prohibited from seeking an
indictment within six months of Mr. Morgan’s arrest, due to his presence in a Montana prison,
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and thus failed to show good cause justifying the violation of Mr. Morgan’s statutory right to a
speedy trial.
The State’s final appellate argument is the assertion that the district court’s failure to
grant Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss is harmless because, if the district court had dismissed the
case, the prosecutor presumably would have re-filed the same charges for a third time through a
new criminal complaint.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-8.)  The State’s argument is specious for a
number of reasons.
First, if this Court finds the district court should have granted Mr. Morgan’s motion to
dismiss,  by  definition,  the  error  would  not  be  harmless,  because  this  Court  would  necessarily
have to find the district court should have dismissed the case. The harmless error test articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), applying to
all preserved errors found by Idaho Appellate Courts (see State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227
(2010)), is not beholden to the presumed ability or inability of the prosecutor to re-file charges
and obtain convictions anew.  Such a standard would require an appellate Court to theorize what
might have happened in proceedings conducted in an alternative universe, or what could happen
in future proceedings conducted in this universe, rather than look at how the error effected the
actual proceedings spawning the appeal before the Court.  This is simply not the standard. See
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (“To hold an error as
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”).
Next, while the prosecutor may have re-filed charges if the district court granted
Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss, there is no evidence in the record that it would have done so.
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The  State  is  required  to  show  the  error  is  harmless  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  (see Perry),  a
standard that requires more than supposition on the part of the State’s appellate counsel.
Finally, even in the counter-factual put forth by the State’s appellate counsel where the
prosecutor presumably would have re-filed the charges upon the district court granting
Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss, the State has failed to prove Mr. Morgan would have been
convicted of those theoretical charges.  Mr. Morgan argued to the district court that the doctrine
of laches should preclude the State from arguing the tolling provisions of I.C. § 19-404 because,
while Mr. Morgan was out of the State during the 5-year statute of limitations period, the State
knew he was in custody in Montana and could have pursued the charges, but chose not to.
(R.,  pp.53-54.)   Although  the  district  court  ultimately  did  not  reach  a  conclusion  on  the
applicability  of  the  doctrine  of  laches,  the  prosecuting  attorney  acknowledged,  “laches  would
work” under certain circumstances.  (Tr., p.55, Ls.2-15.)  While the prosecutor’s
acknowledgment should not be seen as a concession that it would be legally precluded from re-
filing charges,3 it certainly belies the idea that the State has proven to this Court, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the district court’s error in denying Mr. Morgan’s motion to dismiss is
harmless.
In sum, the State’s harmless error argument fails because it misapplies the Perry
standard.  Idaho Appellate Court’s consider what actually happened, not what could have
happened  if  the  district  court  did  not  err  in  the  first  place.   If  the  prosecutor  seeks  to  re-file
3 The prosecutor’s statement was made in response the district court’s inquiry about the
application  of  laches  in  the  context  of  the  parties’  discussion  about  the  application  of  the
Interstate Agreement on Detainer’s Act, and should not be seen as a concession that laches
would necessarily preclude the State from re-filing charges.  (Tr., p.35, L.5 – p.72, L.13.)
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charges upon this Court granting Mr. Morgan’s request for appellate relief, the legality of such a
decision, and the consequences thereof, should be first addressed by the district court.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Morgan respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s orders
denying his motions to dismiss, and to vacate his conviction for felony eluding, and the sentence
imposed upon that conviction.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2017.
___________/s/______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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